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Abstract
We study aggregation of information when voters can collect information of diﬀerent pre-
cision, with increased precision entailing an increasing marginal cost. In order to properly
understand the incentives to collect information we introduce another dimension of het-
erogeneity: on top of the ideological dimension we allow for diﬀerent levels of intensity
in preferences. Contrary to traditional models of endogenous information, in equilibrium,
there are voters collecting information of diﬀerent qualities. After characterizing all sym-
metric Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies for arbitrary rules of election and fairly general
distribution of types. We study information aggregation in symmetric electorates and show
that information aggregates even when voters collect information of diﬀerent qualities.
Keywords: Endogenous Information, Aggregation of Information, Heterogeneity.
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1 Introduction
The Condorcet Jury Theorem has attracted a lot of attention from political scientists and
economists. In its original form it states that if voters have common values and report
truthfully their preferences (or signals) large democracies using the simple majority rule will
elect the right candidate1. Most of the early work has been devoted to study the case in
which there are two states of nature, two candidates and voters receive an exogenous signal
that is correlated with the true state of nature (Young (1988), Mueller (2003) and Berend
and Paroush (1998)).
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) show that the as-
sumption that voters report truthfully is only rational under very particular circumstances.
If voters behave strategically and consider that their vote is only relevant when it is piv-
otal, they should use more information to decide how to vote besides their private signal.
Nonetheless, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) sow that under very general circumstances
the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds when voters properly condition on pivotal events.
One relevant question that is seldom addressed is how voters get the information they use
to vote. The larger the electorate, the smaller the probability a vote will actually aﬀect the
outcome of the election; a rational voter will then have less incentives to acquire information
if this information is costly and, in the limit, every voter should be rationally ignorant.
Yariv (2004) uses this intuition and assume that, when the electorate grows the signal that
a voter receives is less precise. When a voter’s information worsens with the size of the
electorate, the speed at which the precision of the signal a voter receives decreases is crucial
for information aggregation. Martinelli (2006) provides microfoundations for the results in
Yariv (2004). He allows each voter to select the quality of information they use to vote
assuming an increasing marginal cost for the precision of this information. His paper is the
first one to study the rational ignorance hypothesis when voters can select the quality of
information from a continuum of diﬀerent qualities. He shows that information aggregation
depends crucially on the shape of the cost function. In particular the second and third
derivative when very little information is collected determines whether there will be or not
information aggregation. The results go in line with the results in Yariv (2004) regarding
the speed at which a voter’s quality of information decreases with the size of the electorate.2
Martinelli (2006) provides suﬃcient conditions under simple majority rule that, among
1We focus here in non costly voting models. There is a vast literature that assumes that voting is costly
for the voter. This literature discusses what is known as the "Paradox of non-voting". See Borgers (2004)
for private values analysis, Krishna and Morgan (2005) for common values analysis, and Feddersen (2004)
for a survey.
2Martinelli (2007) assumes that voters diﬀer on the cost of information acquisition and shows that full
information aggregation is possible if there is a positive probability of information acquisition being free.
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other things, imply that in equilibrium every voter that decides to collect information, collects
the same quality of information. As Martinelli (2006) we study information aggregation in a
two state-two candidate election when voters are allowed to select the quality of information
they use before deciding how to vote but we extendMartinelli (2006) in one crucial dimension.
Instead of modelling preferences as it is traditional in voting (Martinelli (2006), Yariv
(2004), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)) we model
voter’s preferences assuming preferences with two dimensions of heterogeneity. In one dimen-
sion, voters diﬀer on the ideological axis: there is "right" and "left"; on the other dimension,
voters diﬀer on the level of concern: there are irresponsible and responsible members. These
more general preferences generate voters that endogenously collect diﬀerent qualities of in-
formation which is not the case in Martinelli (2006) since all informed voters are equally
informed. Our main result of the paper is that, even when voters are heterogeneously in-
formed, information aggregation under simple majority rule is possible.
The rest of the Paper is organized as follows. We present our model in the next sec-
tion. Section 3 solves the model for arbitrary rules and a fairly arbitrary composition of
the electorate. We discuss the incentives to collect information and vote separately before
presenting the characterization and existence result. The main results of the paper are pre-
sented in Section 4 and we provide a more technical discussion of Martinelli (2006) results
there. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are provided in an Appendix.
2 The model
There are n potential voters that must decide between two options A and Q. There are two
states of nature (ω ∈ {a, q}) and the probability of state a is given by φ = Pr (a) which is
common knowledge. Let X= {Q,A} stand for the set of available voting actions. We refer
to a generic voting rule as R.
There are three classes of voters: responsive, partisan for A and partisan for Q.
Partisan voters for A (Q) always vote for candidate A (Q), while responsive voters have
contingent preferences described by θ = {θq, θa} ∈ [0, 1]2. Let U (d | ω) be the utility derived
from candidate d ∈ {A,Q} winning in state ω ∈ {a, q}. The utility that a responsive voter
with preferences θ derives for diﬀerent outcomes (winning candidates) is contingent in the
state and can be described by the four terms U (A | a) = U (Q | q) = 0, U (A | q) = −θq
and U (Q | a) = −θa. We refer to responsive voter i’s preferences (the pair θq and θa) as her
type, and to a "responsive voter type θ" simply as a "type θ".
In behavioral terms using two dimensions of heterogeneity enriches the interpretation of
voters’ preferences. For example, when preferences are restricted to one dimension a voter
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who suﬀers a high utility loss for selecting the wrong candidate in one state suﬀers only a
small utility loss for a mistake in the other state. By introducing the extra dimension (concern
or intensity) we are able to generate voters that actually diﬀer on the overall level of care
for any type of mistakes. On the other hand, for the quality of information to significantly
diﬀer across voters for any voting rule and any level of asymmetry in the electorate it is
not enough to use only ideological diﬀerences. Imagine a voter that suﬀers the same utility
losses for electing the wrong candidate (say for example x) in any state and another one that
suﬀers y for any mistake. If x < y the first voter has little incentives to acquire information,
while the more concerned voter (second one) will be more willing to invest in order to receive
a highly precise signal.
Preferences are private information. A voter is responsive with probability (1− α) and
partisan for A (Q) with probability αξA (α (1− ξA)), where α ∈ (0, 1) and ξA ∈ (0, 1). If
the voter is responsive, her preferences are drawn independently from a distribution with
cumulative distribution function F on [0, 1]2 with no mass points. We assume that F , α and
ξA are common knowledge.
Once nature selects a profile of types and preferences are assigned, a voter can invest
in collecting information. Each responsive voter i can select pi ∈

1
2
, 1

where pi is the
parameter of a Bernoulli random variable S that takes values on the set {sq, sa}. We assume
that the probability of signal s = sω in state ω ∈ {a, q} is equal to the parameter pi selected
by voter i:
Pr (sω | p,ω) = pi for ω ∈ {a, q}
The precision cost is given by C :

1
2
, 1

→ R+ where we assume that:
Assumption 1 The cost function C is twice continuously diﬀerentiable everywhere in

1
2
, 1

and satisfies 1) C  (p) > 0 and C  (p) > 0 for all p > 1
2
, 2) C

1
2

= C 

1
2

= 0, 3)
C 

1
2

≥ 0, and 4) lim
p→1
C  (p)→∞.
The last part of assumption (1) implies that there are no fully informed voters in equi-
librium. C 

1
2

= 0 simplifies the analysis but allowing for C 

1
2

> 0 would essentially
introduce a fixed cost of information acquisition (see Martinelli (2006) for a discussion).
Definition 1 A regular committee of size n is a committee with mandatory voting and n
members in which preferences are described by the parameters (α, ξA) ∈ (0, 1)
2 and the cdf
F over [0, 1]2 with no mass points, and continuous pdf f , the prior probability of state a is
φ ∈ (0, 1), and the cost technology of information acquisition verifies assumption (1).
Definition 2 A pure strategy for voter i is an investment function Pi : [0, 1]
2 →

1
2
, 1

and a
voting function Vi : [0, 1]
2×{sq, sa}→X, such that Pi (θ) is the investment level of responsive
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voter i type θ, and Vi (θ, S) = (Vi (θ, sq) , Vi (θ, sa)) is the contingent vote of responsive voter
i type θ who receives the signal S ∈ {sq, sa}.3
When we refer to a generic voting function, investment function or strategy, we omit the
superscript indicating types. We refer to the voter’s behavior (strategy) as V (θ, S) and to
an arbitrary pair of votes as (vq, va) ∈X2. V (θ, S) is part of an strategy while (vq, va) is
basically notation. When we want to refer to a particular vote we use just v.
We will refer to a profile of strategies as

P , V

where P = (P1, ...Pn) and V = (V1, ...Vn)
are the profile of investment functions and voting functions for the whole committee. Anal-
ogously

P−i, V −i

is the profile of strategies for all players but player i. We will say
that, if V (θ, s) = v for all s ∈ {sq, sa} type θ uses an uninformed voting function, and
if V (θ, sq) = V (θ, sa) type θ uses an informed voting function. We therefore identify
strategies by the voting function they employ.
Conditional on the profile of strategies of all voters but i,

P−i, V −i

, we define the
probability that the winner is x ∈ {Q,A} in state ω ∈ {q, a}, when voter i casts vote v ∈X,
as
Pr

x | ω, v,

P−i, V −i

(1)
Since a voter selects the quality of information after observing her type but before observing
the signal, while the vote is decided after observing the signal, we need to define payoﬀs in
diﬀerent stages of the game. The expected utility of player i of type θ ∈ [0, 1]2 when she
votes v ∈X , and the state is ω ∈ {q, a}, is
ui (v | θ,ω) ≡ −θω Pr

(−ω) | ω, v,

P−i, V −i

(2)
where we let (−ω) = Q if ω = a and (−ω) = A if ω = q. This expression is just the product
of the disutility of a mistake (−θω) and the probability of a mistake in the state ω ∈ {q, a},
given player i’s vote v. We define the expected utility of player i of type θ ∈ [0, 1]2 and
investment choice p ∈

1
2
, 1

, when she votes v ∈X after receiving the signal s ∈ {sq, sa} as
U i (p, v | θ, s) ≡

ω∈{q,a}
ui (v | θ,ω) Pr (ω | s, p) (3)
Using (3), the expected utility of player i of type θ ∈ [0, 1]2 and investment choice
3The reader may argue that voting rules should be contingent in the level of investment performed by
each voter so V : [0, 1]2×  12 , 1
2×{sq, sa}→X. This approach substantially complicates the model without
aﬀecting any of the results. That results are unaﬀected follows by the fact that between the investment
decision and voting decision no other public information is revealed to the voters.
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p ∈

1
2
, 1

, for a voting function (vq, va) is
U i (p, (vq, va)) | θ) ≡

x∈{q,a}
U i (p, vx | θ, sx) Pr (sx | p) (4)
We study symmetric Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies.
Definition 3 A symmetric Bayesian equilibrium for the voting game in a regular committee
with voting rule R and voting alternatives X is a strategy (P ∗ (θ) , V ∗ (θ, S)) such that: 1)
all voters use (V ∗ (θ, S) , P ∗ (θ)), 2) for every θ ∈ [0, 1]2, and for any other feasible (vq, va)
and p, the strategy (P ∗ (θ) , V ∗ (θ, S)) satisfies
U i (P ∗ (θ) , V ∗ (θ, S) | θ)− C (P ∗ (θ)) ≥ U i (p, (vq, va) | θ)− C (p) (5)
From now on, we omit the strategy profile of all other players as an argument of endoge-
nous variables. Therefore, the probability of a particular outcome of the decision x ∈ {Q,A},
in state ω, after player i cast a vote v ∈X, is written as Pr (x | ω, v). Using the assumption
that every voter uses the same strategy in equilibrium, the probability that an arbitrary
voter j = i votes for v ∈X, in state ω, when all other players but i are using the strategy
(P (θ) , V (θ, S)) is
Pr (v | ω) = (1− α)

θ∈[0,1]2

s∈{sq ,sa}
I (V (θ, s) = v) Pr (s | P (θ) ,ω) dF (θ) + αξv (6)
The first part of the right side is just the probability that a voter is responsive multiplied by
the probability that a responsive voter votes for v ∈X. The second part is the probability
that a voter is partisan, multiplied by the probability that a partisan member votes for v ∈X.
This expression aggregates over the two sources of private information present in the model:
the type of player and the signal received after investment.4
Recalling the expression (1) and fixing all players’ strategies but i’s, we also define the
change in the probability of A winning when voter i switches her vote from Q to A in state
ω as,
ΔPr (ω, Q) ≡ Pr (A | ω, A)− Pr (A | ω, Q) (7)
Again, we must recall that ΔPr (ω, Q) for ω ∈ {q, a} are conditioned on the actual profile
of strategies

P−i, V −i

so they both depend on the behavior of all other players. These
new variables are crucial to tackle the existence problem and characterization results in a
manageable way.
4As the reader suspects Pr (x | ω, v) is a combination of Pr (v | ω), for v ∈X, x ∈ {Q,A} and ω ∈ {q, a}.
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3 Solving the model
Let Tk stand for the total number of votes for A, when there are k voters. The voting rule is
defined as a pair R= (N, r) with n ≥ N ≥ n
2
5 and r ∈ [0, 1], such that A wins if Tn > N and
Q wins if Tn < N ; if Tn = N , A wins with probability 1− r and Q wins with probability r.6
3.1 Voting Incentives
Responsive voters can use four possible voting functions: (Q,A), (A,Q), (A,A), and (Q,Q).
It is straightforward to see that the voting functions (A,A) and (Q,Q) can not induce
positive investment in information in equilibrium. Only (Q,A) and (A,Q) can induce positive
investment in equilibrium. As the reader suspects, (A,Q) can not be optimal. The next
lemma provides conditions for a vote v ∈ {Q,A} to be optimal after receiving the signal
s ∈ {sq, sa} when the investment is p
Lemma 1 In any regular committee, a necessary condition for a responsive voter to vote
for A after receiving the signal s ∈ {sq, sa}, when she is type θ and the investment is p, is
θqΔPr (q,Q) Pr (q | p, s) ≤ θaΔPr (a,Q) Pr (a | p, s) (8)
A necessary condition for a responsive voter type θ with investment p to vote for Q after
receiving the signal s ∈ {sq, sa} is obtained by reversing the sign of (8). Strict inequalities
give suﬃcient conditions.
θqΔPr (q,Q) Pr (q | p, s) is the expected cost of making a mistake (making A the winner
in state q) when switching the vote from Q to A after signal s, while θaΔPr (a,Q) Pr (a | p, s)
is the expected benefit of avoiding a mistake (Q winning in state a) when switching the vote
from Q to A after signal s. Therefore, (8) only states that the voter will vote in favor of A,
when the expected benefit of avoiding a mistake is higher than the expected loss of making
one when changing the vote from Q to A.
Responsive voters will consider how they aﬀect the outcome of the election to decide
how they vote. Since there are always partisan voters every possible configuration of votes
is probable and it is always true that a voter might aﬀect the outcome of the election. The
next lemma states this formally so changing the vote always has an impact in the election
and ΔPr (ω, Q) > 0 for any ω ∈ {q, a}.
5The case with N < n2 can be studied by reversing the roles of Q and A.
6The results are valid for all q-majority rules, such that A is the winner if the percentage of votes in favor
of A is at least N > qn.
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Lemma 2 In any regular committee, there is some ζ (ω) > 0 for each ω ∈ {q, a}, such that
ΔPr (ω, Q) ∈ [ζ (ω) , 1− ζ (ω)]. If n = 1, then ΔPr (ω, Q) = 1 for ω ∈ {q, a}.
Once we know that ΔPr (ω, Q) > 0 for ω ∈ {q, a} it is easy to see that there are no
equilibria in which all responsive voters vote for a particular candidate independently of their
preferences. That is, there exist a pair of types θ1 and θ2 such that V (θ1, S) = V (θ2, S).
With Lemma (2) at hand, we can manipulate the expression (8) to show that A is optimal
after signal s ∈ {sq, sa} if
θq
θa
Pr (q | p, s)
Pr (a | p, s) ≤
ΔPr (a,Q)
ΔPr (q,Q)
(9)
Obviously, Q is optimal if the sign is reversed in expression (9). ΔPr(a,Q)ΔPr(q,Q) is determined in
equilibrium, while θqθa
Pr(q|p,s)
Pr(a|p,s) is the voter’s private information information. Condition (9) will
allow us to construct functions that separate types that prefer v = A over v = Q conditional
on the signal and the investment.
We proceed now to determine the responsive voters’ optimal voting function. There are
basically two informed strategies: the strategy with the voting function (A,Q), and the
strategy with the voting function (Q,A). If the signal is informative, it is not optimal for
a responsive voter to vote against the information that she receives in all circumstances. A
player using a strategy with the informed voting function (A,Q) is doing just that. Only
uninformed voters that are indiﬀerent between option A and Q may use (A,Q). Therefore,
(A,Q) is not used in equilibrium with positive probability.
Lemma 3 In any regular committee, the voting function (A,Q) may be used in equilibrium
only by types that satisfy θaθq =
ΔPr(q,Q)
ΔPr(a,Q)
(1−φ)
φ , and if they use it, they do not collect informa-
tion; for all other types it is not optimal. The set of types who do not acquire information
and use an informative strategy has measure 0 in equilibrium.
If a responsive voter uses an uninformed strategy, this voter cannot be collecting informa-
tion. If a voter type θ invests, it must be the case that she is following an informed strategy.
Now, we can separate the types in those that always vote for A, types that always vote for
Q, and types that collect information and change the vote according to the signal received.
We will refer to types that always vote for A (or Q) without performing any investment
as supporters for A (or Q), and types that invest and change their vote according to the
signal received as independents.
3.2 Information acquisition
In this section we derive the optimal investment function for independents. Using (4), the
optimal investment function of players that use the informed strategy with (Q,A) is defined
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implicitly by7:
C  (P ∗ (θ)) = θqΔPr (q,Q) (1− φ) + θaΔPr (a,Q)φ (10)
When C 

1
2

= 0,8 the fact that C  (p) > 0 for all p > 1
2
, and the implicit function theorem
imply that P ∗ (θ) exists, is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave
for all θ = (0, 0). Recalling that there exists some ζ (ω) such that ΔPr (ω, Q) ≤ 1 − ζ (ω)
(see Lemma (2)) we conclude that C  (P ∗ (θ)) ≤ max
ω∈{q,a}
(1− ζ (ω)), and since lim
x→1
C  (x)→∞
we know that P ∗ (θ) ≤ η for some η < 1.
The informed strategy (Q,A) is used whenever its expected utility, net of investment
costs, is higher than the expected utility derived from using any uninformed strategy (see
condition (5)). The next lemma introduces an expression to compare the informed strategy
with (Q,A) with the uninformed strategies.
Lemma 4 In any regular committee, a necessary condition for voter type θ, to use a strategy
with voting function V (θ, S) = (Q,A), and investment function P ∗ (θ) > 1
2
that satisfies
(10), is that
C  (P ∗ (θ))P ∗ (θ)− C (P ∗ (θ))− θωΔPr (ω, Q) Pr (ω) ≥ 0 (11)
for all ω ∈ {q, a}. A suﬃcient condition is obtained if (11) holds with strict inequality.
The informed strategy (Q,A) is preferred to the uninformed strategy (A,A) if we let
ω = a in condition (11), and the informed strategy (Q,A) is preferred to the uninformed
strategy (Q,Q) if we let ω = q in condition (11). In order to determine which type prefers
which strategy, we define implicitly the functions gω : R→ R such that the pair (gω (θa) , θa)
satisfies (11) with equality:
C  (P ∗ (ga (θa) , θa))P
∗ (ga (θa) , θa)− C (P ∗ (ga (θa) , θa)) = θaΔPr (a,Q)φ
C  (P ∗ (gq (θa) , θa))P
∗ (gq (θa) , θa)− C (P ∗ (gq (θa) , θa)) = gq (θa)ΔPr (q,Q) (1− φ)
where P ∗ (gω (θa) , θa), ω ∈ {q, a} satisfies (10). Each function gω, ω ∈ {q, a} partitions the
space of types [0, 1]2 in two regions: gq separates types that prefer the informed strategy
(Q,A) to the uninformed strategy (Q,Q), and ga separates types that prefer the informed
strategy (Q,A) to the uninformed strategy (A,A).
Let ω = q in condition (11), and note that the left side of (11) is decreasing in θq.
Therefore, any θ ∈ [0, 1]2 such that θq > gq (θa), prefers the uninformed strategy with (Q,Q)
to the informed strategy with (Q,A). On the other hand, if θq < gq (θa) the informed
7Second order conditions follow directly by convexity of C.
8If C 

1
2

> 0, the set of types that may use the informed voting rule (Q,A) must satisfy min {θq, θa} > 0.
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strategy is preferred. If ω = a in condition (11), any pair θ ∈ [0, 1]2 such that θq > ga (θa)
prefers the informed strategy with (Q,A) to the uninformed strategy with (A,A).
Using the implicit function theorem, each gω (θa) for ω ∈ {q, a} exists, is continuously
diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing for all θ = (0, 0). Moreover, gq (θa) is strictly convex
and ga (θa) is strictly concave for all θ = (0, 0), and gq (θa)− ga (θa) is strictly increasing for
all θa > 0, with lim
x→0
gω (x) = 0, for all ω ∈ {q, a}.9
3.3 Characterization and existence of equilibrium
3.3.1 Characterization
The functions gq (θa) and ga (θa) separate the space of types in three groups that use diﬀerent
strategies. All responsive voters type θ ∈ [0, 1]2 with θq < ga (θa) use a simple strategy
described by constant functions: P (θ) = 1
2
and V (θ, s) = A, for s ∈ {sq, sa}. The same can
be said for responsive voters with type θq > gq (θa) where V (θ, s) = Q, for s ∈ {sq, sa}. The
interesting group is the set of responsive voters θ ∈ [0, 1]2 that satisfy ga (θa) ≤ θq ≤ gq (θa)
(independents), since both the investment function and the voting function change with the
type and the signal.
The functions gq (θa) and ga (θa) ensure the strategies are optimal, and the backward
induction process ensures that the voting function is optimal when conditional on the optimal
investment level. This is formally stated in the next proposition
Proposition 1 In any regular committee of size n ≥ 1 in which the voting rule is R= (N, r),
the strategy (P ∗ (θ) , V ∗ (θ, S)) that prescribes
1. the investment function P ∗ (θ) as defined in (10) for every θ that satisfies ga (θa) ≤
θq ≤ gq (θa), and P ∗ (θ) = 12 otherwise,
2. the voting function V ∗ (θ, S) = (A,A) if θq < ga (θa), V ∗ (θ, S) = (Q,Q) if θq > gq (θa),
and V ∗ (θ, S) = (Q,A) if ga (θa) ≤ θq ≤ gq (θa),
is a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium.
9It is worth noting two features of these results used later for existence. First, P ∗ may be defined for
θ /∈ [0, 1]2. Indeed, as long as θ satisfies C  (1) >

ω∈{a,q}
θωΔPr (ω, Q) Pr (ω), P ∗ (θ) is well defined. Second,
gq (θa) and ga (θa) are also properly defined for all θ that satisfy C  (1) >

ω∈{a,q}
θωΔPr (ω, Q) Pr (ω), even
if θ /∈ [0, 1]2.
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In Figure (1) we illustrate the equilibrium in an election where the simple majority rule
is in place for n odd, φ = 1
2
, F symmetric around the 45o degree line10, and ξA =
1
2
. In this
case the equilibrium is fully symmetric around the 45o degree line: ga (y) = x iﬀ gq (x) = y
and P ∗ (θ) = P ∗ (θ), for every θ = (x, y) and θ = (y, x).
1
1.pdf
1
q
a
ag
qag
''a'a
Fixed investment
Fixed relative
rankingSupporters of Q Independents
Figure 1: Equilibrium under the plurality rule and n is odd. Supporters of A (Q) always vote for A (Q) and
do not collect information. Independents collect information according to equation (10), and vote according
to the signal received: if S = sa then v = A and if S = sq then v = Q.
3.3.2 Existence
The fact that the equilibrium strategy is composed of an investment function that is only
C0 almost everywhere,11 complicates the direct use of standard fixed point theorems on the
space of best responses. In order to show existence we create a transformation that uses the
optimal investment function and the optimal voting strategies as arguments. In this manner,
10That is F (x, y) = F (y, x) for all (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2.
11See the equicontinuity requirement for Schauder’s Fixed Point Theorem in Rudin (1973). In turns some
assumption abut the diﬀerentiability of P ∗ (θ) is required which can be translated into C 

1
2

> 0. This
condition rules out any possible aggregation of information in the limit as shown by Martinelli (2006).
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the equilibrium can be described by the functions gω (θa), ω ∈ {q, a} and the investment
function P ∗ (θa) that are uniquely defined by ΔPr (ω, Q)
∗, ω ∈ {q, a}.
Proposition 2 In any regular committee of size n ≥ 1 in which the voting rule is R= (N, r),
there exists a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is characterized
by the strategy (P ∗ (θ) , V ∗ (θ, S)) in Proposition (1).
Although we can not prove that for each set of primitives (φ, n, (N, r), F (·), α, ξA, C (·))
there is a unique equilibrium (a unique set of gq (θa), ga (θa) and P ∗ (θ)), we know that every
symmetric Bayesian equilibrium is described by a set of cut oﬀ functions gq (θa) and ga (θa)
and a investment function P ∗ (θ). Therefore, our characterization is valid for all symmetric
Bayesian equilibria.
3.3.3 Intuitive characterization
Supporters for A are characterized by a high relative ratio of losses θaθq while supporters for
Q are characterized by a low relative ratio of losses θaθq . Independents have more balanced
preferences and invest to collect information and follow the signal accordingly.
There are two main forces that drive a voter’s behavior when information is endogenous:
the relative ranking of alternatives (θaθq ) and the actual level of utility losses (min {θa, θq}).
When θaθq is high (biased towards A) a vote for Q is only possible if the evidence in favor
of state q is overwhelming. When information is endogenous, this information depends on
the level of losses through the function

ω∈{a,q}
θωΔPr (ω, Q) Pr (ω), so the information level
increases as we move away from the origin. For a fixed level of θaθq , the higher θa, the higher
the precision selected if the informed strategy is used in equilibrium. For example, along the
"fixed relative ranking" line in Figure (1), θaθq is fixed; when θa < θ

a the information collected
if (Q,A) were used is not too strong. Because of this imprecise information, a responsive
voter cannot be too sure that the true state is q when the signal received is sq; therefore, she
prefers to save on the cost of information than buying reassurance that the true state is q.
When θa > θ

a, the precision of the information collected if (Q,A) were used is high enough
to induce a responsive voter to select Q when the signal is sq.
What would happen if the information were free and its precision were exactly P ∗ (θ)
for each type θ? For types (θq, θa) such that θq is much smaller than ga (θa), the free signal
does not alter their behavior: they would still be supporters for A. These voters decide
strategically to ignore their information. But for types (θq, θa) such that θq is close but
smaller than ga (θa), if the information were free, they would vote in favor of Q instead of
A. In essence, the reason why some (θq, θa) with θq close but smaller than ga (θa) behave
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as a supporter is due to the cost of information: a signal with the precision she would have
selected if it were forced to collect information would have made her change her vote, but
that signal is too costly.
Alternatively, fix the precision of the information collected by informed voters along the
"fixed investment" line in Figure (1). When the type θ satisfies θa < θ

a, the precision of
the information collected when (Q,A) is used is not high enough to make the player vote
in favor of A. Then there is no reason to collect information. When θa is close to 0, any
free information would be disregarded, and if θa is close to θ

a, free information is welcome.
When θa ∈

θ

a, θ

a

, preferences are balanced enough for (Q,A) to be preferred given the
optimal p. In that case information is collected and the signal guides the voting function.
When θa > θ

a, the problem is that the signal in favor of Q is not strong enough, and the
responsive voter becomes a supporter of A.
Besides the assume existence of partisan voters, there are supporters for A, supporters
for Q and independents in any equilibrium. This is basically driven by the fact that ΔPr(a,Q)ΔPr(q,Q)
is bounded by

ζ(a)
1−ζ(q) ,
1−ζ(q)
ζ(a)

and p
1−p is bounded by

1, η
1−η

. Using (9), there are always
responsive voters with extreme types (θaθq big enough or small enough): the precision of the
signal that would have been collected if (Q,A) were used could not have overturned the
relative bias.
4 Information Aggregation
Martinelli (2006) is the first model jointly studying both the Condorcet Jury Theorem and the
rational ignorance hypothesis in the same set up by allowing voters to collect information
of the same quality. He gives individual rationality to the exogenous process that Yariv
(2004) assumes, and he shows that the form of the cost function for information acquisition
determines whether there is aggregation of information or not. On a first section he assumes
homogeneity (θia = θa and θ
i
q = θq for all i) and introduces heterogeneity as an extension (θ
i
a
and θiq might diﬀer for diﬀerent voters). He also assumes preferences to be single dimensional
so, in our terms, θq + θa = 1 and focuses on the simple majority rule.
When preferences are heterogeneous Martinelli (2006) assumes that both θa and θq are
uniform and φ = (1− φ) = 1
2
which directly leads to ΔPr (q,Q) = ΔPr (a,Q). Note
that the first order conditions for investment (10) together with φ = (1− φ) = 1
2
and
ΔPr (q,Q) = ΔPr (a,Q) give that C  (P ∗ (θ)) = (θq + θa)ΔPr (a,Q)φ =
ΔPr(a,Q)
2
so every
voter that collects information will collect the same quality of information if θq + θa = 1.
At the same time, (19) gives that voters that verify P
∗(θ)
1−P ∗(θ) ≥
θa
θq
≥ P ∗(θ)
1−P ∗(θ) will collect
information and an equilibrium with information acquisition exists for any n as long as
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C 

1
2

= 0. This summarizes Theorem 5 in Martinelli (2006).12 He finds that full aggregation
of information is only possible in large electorates if C 

1
2

= C 

1
2

= C 

1
2

= 0.13
Martinelli’s existence and characterization results crucially depend on the fact that pref-
erences are restricted to θa + θq = 1, the simple majority rule is in place and φ = 12 . This is
because under these conditions every informed voter selects the same quality of information.
Martinelli (2006) looks for equilibria that are described by the cutoﬀs that separates inde-
pendents from supporters and the quality of information that every informed voter collects.
A natural question arises: how general is the aggregation result given that all informed
voters collect the same quality of information? In Figure (1) Martinelli’s informed voters are
independents along the "fixed Investment" line (θq+ θa = 1). Independents with θq+ θa < 1
collect less information and independents with θq + θa > 1 collect more information. It
seems that the average level of information should be higher with flexible preferences (θq
and θa are not perfectly correlated) and it should be easier to aggregate information in the
limit. But it is not clear that the average voter is more informed under flexible preferences
than under restricted preferences. If the committee is actually making better decisions
under flexible preferences it might be that the average voter is collecting poor information
since his information is less valuable. Then, the requirements for aggregation of information
under flexible (two dimensional) preferences might be stronger than under restricted (one
dimensional) preferences.
Below we show that, even when voters collect information of diﬀerent qualities, infor-
mation aggregation is possible if the electorate is symmetric. We define symmetric in the
following way:
Definition 4 A symmetric committee of size n is a regular committee of size n in which
both states are equally likely (φ = 1
2
), partisans vote for each candidate with equal probability
(ξA =
1
2
), and F is symmetric around the 45◦.
In order to study information aggregation, first we need a characterization of the equi-
librium when the majority rule is in place and the number of members is odd.
Proposition 3 In any symmetric committee of size n = 2N + 1 with simple majority
rule, for every N ≥ 0, there is a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium characterized by the pair
12The results of the previous section can be easily extended to the case of θa + θq = 1 but neither this
assumption or the assumption that φ = 12 are necessary to show existence or characterize the equilibria with
information acquisition. It is easy to see that if C 

1
2

> 0 there is no information acquisition for suﬃciently
large n.
13If C 

1
2

= C 

1
2

= 0 and C 

1
2

> 0, Martinelli (2006) obtains a specific limit (when the electorate
grows) on the probability of making the right choice. This limit is decreasing in C 

1
2

and approaches 1
when C 

1
2

→ 0. If C 

1
2

> C 

1
2

= 0 both candidates have equal chances of winning in any state of
nature when the electorate is suﬃciently large.
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(xN , yN) ∈ (0, 1)2, where 1) ΔPr (ω, Q) = xN for ω ∈ {q, a}, 2) Pr (A | a) = 12 + yN (1− α),
3) Pr (A | a) = Pr (Q | q), and 4) P (θ) is such that C  (P ∗ (θ)) = (θq+θa)xN
2
.
Along any path of equilibria indexed by N , the probability of selecting A when the state
is a is equal to the probability of selecting Q when the state is q. From now on, when we
refer to A being selected in state a, it should be understood that we refer to the probability
that the committee selects the candidate that would have won had the true state of nature
been common knowledge.
What is the eﬀect of increasing the number of voters? Intuition suggests that the proba-
bility of being pivotal decreases when the number of voters increases. This is straightforward
only if the level of information in the electorate is constant. Unfortunately, when the infor-
mation collected by each voter decreases (but the number of voters remains constant) the
outcome of the election becomes more random. This extra randomness translates into a
higher probability of being pivotal. Nevertheless, we can prove that under the simple ma-
jority rule the eﬀect of more voters is dominant, and investment decreases when the size of
the electorate increases. Indeed,
Proposition 4 In any symmetric committee with the simple majority rule, P ∗ (θ) and
ΔPr (ω, Q) decrease with N .
This proves that the rational ignorance hypothesis holds in our model.14 This does not
imply that information aggregation is not possible under any circumstances. The probability
that a large electorate makes the right choice depends on the speed at which information
acquisition decreases in the electorate when the number of voters increases (Yariv (2004)).
Indeed
Proposition 5 In any symmetric committee of size n (odd) with the simple majority rule,
if the cost function is three times diﬀerentiable with C  ≥ 0 and F (θq, θa) = θqθa,15 then
1. if C 

1
2

= 0 and C 

1
2

> 0, the result of the election approaches a random vari-
able that makes A the winner with probability 1
2
in any state of nature when N grows
arbitrarily large.
2. if C 

1
2

= C 

1
2

= 0 and C 

1
2

> 0, when N grows arbitrarily large, the probability
of making the right choice is bounded away from 1
2
, and the bound is decreasing on the
value of C 

1
2

.
14Benz and Stutzer (2004) find empirical support for the probability of being pivotal being positively
correlated with the quality of information.
15The uniform distribution of types and independence across parameters is a simplification: all results
hold if F is symmetric arounf the 45o degree line.
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3. if C 

1
2

= C 

1
2

= C 

1
2

= 0, the probability of making the right choice converges
to 1 when N grows arbitrarily large.
Note that the aggregation result depends on the value of C 

1
2

. Using that C  (P ∗ (θ)) =
(θq+θa)ΔPr(a,Q)
2
we have that the direct eﬀect of ΔPr (a,Q) on P ∗ (θ) is determined by the
second derivative of the cost function while the change in this change ( ∂
2P ∗(θ)
∂(ΔPr(a,Q))2 ) is aﬀected
by the third derivative of the cost function. In our model increasing the number of voters
increases the chances of a vote being informative but reduces the incentives to collect infor-
mation of all voters. When the speed at which the average information decreases because
new voters are added is slow enough, aggregation of information is possible in the limit.
The cost function for information acquisition determines whether adding another member is
desirable or not.
5 Conclusions
Allowing for endogenous information creates serious problems to well known established
results.16 For example, Stiglitz and Grossman (1980) show that eﬃciency and endogenous
information are not as easily paired in competitive markets as Hayek (1945) suggested.17
Even the existence of endogenous information equilibria is problematic18. Moreover, the
non-existence problem appears in much simpler set ups as the demand for information is not
well behaved.19 Given these results and the fact that most of the literature on committees
focuses on models with exogenous information we ask: are the exogenous information results
in committees robust to the introduction of endogenous information?
We develop a model of voting where voters endogenously select the quality of the infor-
mation they will use to vote.20 Voters who receive reports or memos need to expend time
and eﬀort to understand the information. This decision is endogenous so there is no reason
16See Stiglitz (2002) for a broader survey of information economics discussing problems arising with en-
dogenous information and incentives to collect this information.
17For example, in Prat (2002) allowing for endogenous information in the electorate will kill voters’ in-
centives to collect private signals in the separating equilibrium (in Prat (2002) terms: z will not convey
any information). Voters will rely solely on campaign advertisement to decide the candidates’ valence and
interest groups are indiﬀerent between contributing or not to campaigns (see point 1, page 1007 in Prat
(2002)).
18See Green (1977); see Dubey et al. (1987) for further developments departing from competitve markets.
19See Stiglitz and Radner (1984) for a seminal exposition in simple environments and Chade and Schlee
(2002) for an extension to continuous set ups and generalizations.
20For any rule besides the unanimity rule, if there are no partisans, there is always an equilibrium where
all voters vote for A (Q) and do not collect any information. Although we assume the existence of partisans
all our results hold when we assume away these voters and let all voters be responsive and use non-weakly
dominated strategies.
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to expect that diﬀerent voters will be equally informed. Modelling information acquisition
in elections as a choice over a set of signals with diﬀerent precision is more accurate than
assuming a common source of information for all voters. In line with this observation, we
allow voters to select the correlation between the signal they will receive and the true state of
nature.
We assume the level of conflict among committee members to be richer than it is usually
assumed in the literature. When information is exogenous, all the relevant interaction be-
tween the committee members can be represented by simple structures. Indeed, preferences
modelled as a relative ranking of alternatives capture all the proper incentives to study vot-
ing decisions: ideological heterogeneity is enough. This restriction on preferences imposes
correlation between the disutilities that a member derives from mistaken decisions. When
information is endogenous, this restriction does not capture all the relevant strategic inter-
action: voters with the same ranking of alternatives may have diﬀerent incentives to collect
information. We assume that committee members’ preferences are flexible and introduce
another dimension of heterogeneity: committee members not only diﬀer on their ideological
position but they also diﬀer on the level of concern about the outcome of the election.
We provide existence and characterization results for arbitrary rules of election, arbitrary
but continuous distribution of types and heterogeneity in preferences. We give a natural and
intuitive representation of the equilibrium behavior of committee members. This geomet-
ric representation of equilibrium is important in order to derive the existence result. In
equilibrium, our model predicts that informed voters endogenously select diﬀerent levels of
information. Contrary to previous results in the literature, heterogenous preferences trans-
late into heterogenous informed voters. This is directly related to the assumption about
preferences and, in particular, to the second dimension of heterogeneity.
Aggregation results for symmetric electorates and priors are derived without imposing
that every informed member must collect the same quality of information in equilibrium.
Therefore, the aggregation of information derived in Martinelli (2006) does not depend on
the assumed preferences and the homogeneity of information among informed voters. The
"speed" at which information is lost due to the reduction in the probability of being decisive
is the key ingredient in the aggregation of information (Yariv (2004)).
A crucial technical diﬀerence between our paper and Martinelli (2006) is the role played
by symmetry in the aggregation results. While in Martinelli (2006) symmetry assures that
every voter selects the same level of information and the probability of being pivotal in both
states is the same (ΔPr (q,Q) = ΔPr (a,Q) for every n), in our paper only the second
part is used. What’s the specific role of ΔPr (q,Q) = ΔPr (a,Q)? If along the equilibrium
path, ΔPr (q,Q) = ΔPr (a,Q) for every n, the cutoﬀ functions ga (θq) and gq (θq) only
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depend on the level of information that the cutoﬀ type selects since the slope of ga (θq) and
gq (θq) depend on
ΔPr(q,Q)
ΔPr(a,Q) . Hence, the eﬀect of an extra voter on the equilibrium behavior
is all determined by the probability of being pivotal and not on the relative ratio of these
probabilities in each state. If ΔPr (q,Q) = ΔPr (a,Q) aggregation results will depend also
on how the ratio ΔPr(q,Q)ΔPr(a,Q) changes with n. In turns, this requires a full characterization
of equilibrium which is, at this point, not possible unless we assume a particular cost of
information function C.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma (1). Using the definition of expected utility in (2) and (3), we have that
a voter will only follow the signal s if
U i (P ∗ (θ) , V ∗ (θ, s) | θ) ≥ U i (P ∗ (θ) , v | θ)
for any v = V ∗ (θ, s). Bayes’ rule gives the result.
Proof of Lemma (2). Assume that all players but i are using the strategy (P, V ) and
player i uses (P i, V i). Let Pr (Tm = k | ω) be the probability that there are k votes for A
out of the m voters when everybody uses the voting function V and the investment function
P . Using the distribution function of a binomial random variable
Pr (Tn−1 = k | ω) = (n− 1)!
(n− 1− k)!k! (Pr (A | ω))
k (1− Pr (A | ω))n−1−k (12)
where Pr (A | ω) is defined as in (6). The probability of candidate A being selected when
member i votes for x ∈ {Q,A} is just
Pr (A | ω, A) = Pr (Tn−1 = N − 1 | ω) (1− r) +
n−1
k=N
Pr (Tn−1 = k | ω) (13)
and
Pr (A | ω, Q) = Pr (Tn−1 = N | ω) (1− r) +
n−1
k=N+1
Pr (Tn−1 = k | ω) (14)
Therefore, using definition (7)
ΔPr (ω, Q) = Pr (Tn−1 = N − 1 | ω) (1− r) + Pr (Tn−1 = N | ω) r (15)
Since Pr (A | ω) ∈ αξA, 1− αξQ

, Pr (A | ω, v) < 1 for v ∈ {Q,A}, then ΔPr (ω, Q) ≤
1 − ζ1 (ω) for some ζ1 (ω) > 0 small enough. On the other hand, using (12), we conclude
that ΔPr (ω, Q) is bigger than
min {Pr (Tn−1 = N − 1 | ω) ,Pr (Tn−1 = N | ω)}
Again, using the fact that Pr (A | ω) ∈ αξA, 1− αξQ

, there is some ζ2 (ω) > 0 such
that ΔPr (ω, Q) ≥ ζ2 (ω). Finally, the result for n = 1 is straightforward.
Proof of Lemma (3). First note that Bayes’ rule gives that Pr(q|sa)
Pr(a|sa) =
(1−p)
p
(1−φ)
φ and
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Pr(q|sq)
Pr(a|sq) =
p
(1−p)
(1−φ)
φ . Using (8), the informed strategy with (A,Q) must satisfy
θqΔPr (q,Q)
p
(1− p)
(1− φ)
φ
≤ θaΔPr (a,Q) (16)
θqΔPr (q,Q)
(1− p)
p
(1− φ)
φ
≥ θaΔPr (a,Q)
so we must have that θqθa
p
(1−p) ≤
θq
θa
(1−p)
p
. If p > 1
2
, we reach a contradiction. If p = 1
2
, it is
necessary for (A,Q) that both inequalities in (16) hold which imply the conditions stated in
the hypothesis: θaθq =
ΔPr(q,Q)
ΔPr(a,Q)
(1−φ)
φ .
Proof of Lemma (4). Using condition (5), the informed strategy with voting function
(Q,A), is as good as an uninformed strategy (vq, va) = (X,X) for X ∈ {Q,A}, iﬀ
C (P ∗ (θ)) ≤ U i (P ∗ (θ) , (Q,A) | θ)− U i
	
1
2
, (X,X) | θ


(17)
where U i 1
2
, (vq, va) | θ

is defined by (4). Using (4) and recallingΔPr (a,Q) andΔPr (q,Q),
(17) reduces to (11), and necessity follows. Suﬃciency of (11) with strict inequality is
straightforward.
Proof of Proposition (1). By construction of the functions gq (θa) and ga (θa), all types
satisfy the optimal condition (5) when using the strategies defined in the proposition. It
remains to show that it is actually optimal to follow that voting function after the signal is
realized.
For supporters for A, condition (8) is just
θq ≤ θa
ΔPr (a,Q)
ΔPr (q,Q)
φ
1− φ (18)
for both signals. In the case of supporters for Q, we must reverse the sign of (18). In the
case of the informed strategy with (Q,A) we must satisfy that
θq ≥ θa
ΔPr (a,Q)
ΔPr (q,Q)
φ
1− φ
1− P ∗ (θ)
P ∗ (θ)
(19)
θq ≤ θa
ΔPr (a,Q)
ΔPr (q,Q)
φ
1− φ
P ∗ (θ)
1− P ∗ (θ)
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Using the fact that gq (θa) is convex and ga (θa) is concave
∂gq (0)
∂θa
θa ≤ gq (θa) ≤
∂gq (θa)
∂θa
θa
∂ga (0)
∂θa
θa ≥ ga (θa) ≥
∂ga (θa)
∂θa
θa
where we used that gω (0) = 0 for ω ∈ {a, q}. An application of the implicit function
theorem gives that ∂g
q(θa)
∂θa
= ΔPr(a,Q)ΔPr(q,Q)
φ
1−φ
P ∗(gq(θa),θa)
1−P ∗(gq(θa),θa) and
∂ga(θa)
∂θa
= ΔPr(a,Q)ΔPr(q,Q)
φ
1−φ
1−P ∗(ga(θa),θa)
P ∗(ga(θa),θa)
which implies
1 ≤ g
q (θa)
θa
ΔPr (q,Q)
ΔPr (a,Q)
1− φ
φ
≤ P
∗ (gq (θa) , θa)
1− P ∗ (gq (θa) , θa)
(20)
1 ≥ g
a (θa)
θa
ΔPr (q,Q)
ΔPr (a,Q)
1− φ
φ
≥ 1− P
∗ (ga (θa) , θa)
P ∗ (ga (θa) , θa)
Since supporters for A satisfy ga (θa) > θq, by the second equation in (20), condition
(18) holds for these voters. Using the first equation in (20) and the fact that supporters
for Q satisfy gq (θa) < θq, condition (18) does not hold for these voters. Therefore, both
uninformed strategies are consistent.
Using the right hand side of the second inequality in (20) and the fact that θq ≥ ga (θa)
for independents gives the first equation in (19). Because gq (θa) is monotone it is in-
vertible and θq ≤ gq (θa) is equal to θa ≥ (gq)−1 (θq). For any θa ≥ (gq)−1 (θq) we must
have that
P ∗(θq ,(gq)−1(θq))
1−P ∗(θq ,(gq)−1(θq))
≤ P
∗(θq ,θa)
1−P ∗(θq ,θa) ; using the first equation in (20) we have that
θq
(gq)−1(θq)
ΔPr(q,Q)
ΔPr(a,Q) ≤
P ∗(θq ,θa)
1−P ∗(θq ,θa) . Using that θa ≥ (g
q)−1 (θq) we have that
θq
(gq)−1(θq)
≥ θqθa
which gives the second equation in (19).
To show the characterization is complete, we need to show that no type θ ∈ [0, 1]2 belongs
to two diﬀerent groups, and the union of independents and supporters covers all [0, 1]2. But
this is obvious, since ga (θa) and gq (θa) cross each other only at (0, 0) for θa ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition (2). P ∗ (θ) changes smoothly with ΔPr (ω, Q), ω ∈ {q, a} for all
θ = (0, 0); this is a direct application of the implicit function theorem to (10). Using the
definitions of gω (θa), ω ∈ {q, a},
∂ga (θa)
∂ΔPr (a,Q)
=
θa
ΔPr (q,Q)
1− P ∗ (ga (θa) , θa)
P ∗ (ga (θa) , θa)
φ
(1− φ)
∂ga (θa)
∂ΔPr (q,Q)
= − g
a (θa)
ΔPr (q,Q)
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∂gq (θa)
∂ΔPr (a,Q)
=
θa
ΔPr (q,Q)
P ∗ (gq (θa) , θa)
1− P ∗ (gq (θa) , θa)
φ
(1− φ)
∂gq (θa)
∂ΔPr (q,Q)
= − g
q (θa)
ΔPr (q,Q)
which implies that both ga (θa) and gq (θa) are continuous in ΔPr (ω, Q), ω ∈ {q, a}. There-
fore Pr (A | ω), ω ∈ {q, a} are continuous in ΔPr (ω, Q), ω ∈ {q, a} for all θ.
Let X =

αξA, 1− αξQ
2
and Y = [ζ (a) , 1− ζ (a)] × [ζ (q) , 1− ζ (q)]. Trivially X × Y
is compact and convex subset of an euclidean space. Let (x1, x2) ∈ X and (y1, y2) ∈ Y be
generic elements of these spaces.
In (10) replace ΔPr (a,Q) for y1 and ΔPr (q,Q) for y2 and define P ∗ (θ) implicitly for
all θ = (0, 0) in terms of y1 and y2 as P ∗ (θ | y1, y2). Now define first the cut oﬀ functions
ga (θa) and gq (θa) by replacing ΔPr (a,Q) for y1 and ΔPr (q,Q) for y2 in the corresponding
conditions (11) and using the function P ∗ (θ | y1, y2): ga (θa | y1, y2) and gq (θa | y1, y2).
Let Ki : Y →

αξA, 1− αξQ

for i = 1, 2 be such that
K1 (y1, y2)− αξA
1− α ≡
1
0
min{1,ga(θa|y1,y2)}
0
dF (θ) +
1
0
min{1,gq(θa|y1,y2)}
min{1,ga(θa|y1,y2)}
P ∗ (θ | y1, y2) dF (θ)
K2 (y1, y2)− αξA
1− α ≡
1
0
min{1,gq(θa|y1,y2)}
0
dF (θ)−
1
0
min{1,gq(θa|y1,y2)}
min{1,ga(θa|y1,y2)}
P ∗ (θ | y1, y2) dF (θ)
Ki, i = 1, 2 are continuous in (y1, y2). Here K1 plays the role of Pr (A | a) and K2 plays the
role of Pr (A | q)
Let K3 :

αξA, 1− αξQ

→ [ζ (a) , 1− ζ (a)] and K4 :

αξA, 1− αξQ

→ [ζ (q) , 1− ζ (q)]
be defined such that
K3 (x1) ≡
(n− 1)!
(n− 1−N)! (N − 1)! (x1)
N−1 (1− x1)n−1−N χ (x1)
K4 (x2) ≡
(n− 1)!
(n− 1−N)! (N − 1)! (x2)
N−1 (1− x2)n−1−N χ (x2)
where χ (x) =

(1−x)(1−r)
(n−N) +
xr
N

. Trivially, Ki, i = 3, 4 are continuous in x1 and x2 respec-
tively. Note thatK3 (x1) plays the role ofΔPr (a,Q) andK4 (x2) plays the role ofΔPr (q,Q)
in (15).
Let Γ : X × Y → X × Y be defined as Γ ≡ (K1, K2, K3, K4) which is continuous. There-
fore, applying Brouwer fixed point theorem (see Border (1985)), there is some (x∗1, x
∗
2, y
∗
1, y
∗
2) ∈
X × Y such that Γ (x∗1, x∗2, y∗1, y∗2) = (x∗1, x∗2, y∗1, y∗2).
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The fact that (x∗1, x
∗
2, y
∗
1, y
∗
2) is an equilibrium follows trivially. Let x
∗
1 = Pr (A | a), x∗2 =
Pr (A | q), y∗1 = ΔPr (a,Q) and y∗2 = ΔPr (q,Q). Since Γ has embedded the description of
the best response functions (ga (θa) , gq (θa)) and P ∗ (θ), for any pair ΔPr (ω, Q), ω ∈ {q, a},
the transformation Γ gives the optimal probabilities of voting for A in each state ω ∈ {q, a}.
(x∗1, x
∗
2) only ensures that actually we have a fixed point in the probabilities of voting that
are constructed using ΔPr (ω, Q), ω ∈ {q, a}.
Proof of Proposition (3). First we are going to prove that Pr (Q | q) = Pr (A | a) iﬀ
ΔPr (a,Q) = ΔPr (q,Q). Using (7) and (12),
ΔPr (ω, Q) =
2N !
N !N !
Pr (Q | ω)N (1− Pr (Q | ω))N (21)
If Pr (Q | q) = Pr (A | a) it is trivial to see that ΔPr (a,Q) = ΔPr (q,Q).
Now assume that ΔPr (a,Q) = ΔPr (q,Q). The first order condition for investment is
just C  (P ∗ (θ)) = (θq+θa)ΔPr(a,Q)
2
so P ∗ (θ1, θ2) = P ∗ (θ2, θ1). By definition,
C (P ∗ (ga (θa) , θa)) =
((θa + ga (θa))P ∗ (ga (θa) , θa)− θa)ΔPr (a,Q)
2
(22)
C (P ∗ (gq (θa) , θa)) =
((θa + gq (θa))P ∗ (gq (θa) , θa)− gq (θa))ΔPr (a,Q)
2
Let θa = θ1 and gq (θ1) = θ2 in the second equation of (22) to get
C (P ∗ (θ2, θ1)) =
((θ1 + θ2)P ∗ (θ2, θ1)− θ2)ΔPr (a,Q)
2
(23)
Using that P ∗ (θ1, θ2) = P ∗ (θ2, θ1) on (23), it follows that
C (P ∗ (θ1, θ2)) =
((θ1 + θ2)P (θ1, θ2)− θ2)ΔPr (a,Q)
2
(24)
Let θ2 = θa in (24) and comparing with the first equation of (22) it follows that ga (θ2) =
θ1. It is easy to see the inverse also follows which implies that gq (θa) = θq ⇐⇒ ga (θq) = θa
or ga = (gq)−1 (geometric symmetry around the 45◦ line).
Now we have to calculate Pr (Q | q) and Pr (A | a). This expressions are:
Pr (Q | q)− α
2
1− α =
1
0
1
min{gq(θa),1}
dF (θ) +
1
0
min{gq(θa),1}
min{ga(θa),1}
P ∗ (θ) dF (θ) (25)
Pr (A | a)− α
2
1− α =
1
0
min{ga(θa),1}
0
dF (θ) +
1
0
min{gq(θa),1}
min{ga(θa),1}
P ∗ (θ) dF (θ)
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Recall that ∂g
a(θa)
∂θa
≤ ΔPr(a,Q)ΔPr(q,Q) ≤
∂gq(θa)
∂θa
, which implies that there is some θ∗∗a ≤ 1 such
that gq (θ∗∗a ) = 1, and the previous expressions are
Pr (Q | q)− α
2
1− α =
θ∗∗a
0
1
gq(θa)
dF (θ) + T (26)
Pr (A | a)− α
2
1− α =
1
0
ga(θa)
0
dF (θ) + T
where
T ≡
1
0
min{gq(θa),1}
min{ga(θa),1}
P ∗ (θ) dF (θ)
≡
1
0
θa
ga(θa)
P ∗ (θ) dF (θ) +
θ∗∗a
0
gq(θa)
θa
P ∗ (θ) dF (θ)
Reversing the order of integration, using that ga = (gq)−1 and F symmetric we have
θ∗∗a
0
⎛
⎝
gq(θa)
θa
P ∗ (θ) f (θ) dθq
⎞
⎠ dθa =
1
0
⎛
⎜⎝
θq
(gq)−1(θq)
P ∗ (θ) f (θ) dθa
⎞
⎟⎠ dθq
=
1
0
⎛
⎜⎝
θq
ga(θq)
P ∗ (θ) f (θ) dθa
⎞
⎟⎠ dθq
so T = 2
1
0
θa
ga(θa)
P ∗ (θ) dF (θ). Using the same argument we have
1
0
ga(θa)
0
f (θ) dθadθq =
θ∗∗a
0
1
gq(θq)
f (θ) dθqdθa
which in turns implies that Pr (A | a) = Pr (Q | q). Now we are ready to show that there is
such equilibrium.
Let X  = {(x1, x2) ∈ X : x1 = x2} and Y  = {(y1, y2) ∈ Y : y1 = y2} where where X =
αξA, 1− αξQ
2
and Y = [ζ (a) , 1− ζ (a)] × [ζ (q) , 1− ζ (q)] as in the Proof of Proposition
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(2). Since X  is closed and convex in X and Y  is closed and convex in Y , the argument used
in that proof with the transformation Γ : X×Y → X×Y is valid and the Brouwer fixed point
theorem gives that there is (x1, x2, y1, y2) ∈ X ×Y  such that Γ (x1, x2, y1, y2) = (x1, x2, y1, y2)
and x1 = x2, y1 = y2.
To complete the proof we define yN = 2
1
0
θa
ga(θa)

P ∗ (θ)− 1
2

dF (θ) and xN = 2N !N !N !

1
4
− (yN)2 (1− α)2
N
Proof of Proposition (4). We first prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 5 In any symmetric committee with the simple majority rule Pr (A | a) is decreasing
in N .
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Let ϕ (x) =

1
2
2 − x2 (1− α)2. Assume that
Pr (A | a) = PN increases with N ; therefore, we must have that (ϕ (PN))N ≥ (ϕ (PN+1))N .
Using that 2N !
N !N !
> 1
4
2N+2!
N+1!N+1!
and ϕ (PN+1) ≤ 14 ,
2N !
N !N !
(ϕ (PN))
N ≥ 2N + 2!
N + 1!N + 1!
(ϕ (PN+1))
N+1
and, ΔPr (ω, Q) in (21) decreases with N , which in turns imply that P ∗ (θ) must decrease
with N as well. Therefore 1−P
∗(θ)
P ∗(θ) increases with N and the slope of the function g
a (θa)
increases while the slope of the function gq (θa) decreases. Then, the functions ga (θa) and
gq (θa) get closer when N increases.
Recalling the expression for Pr(A|a)−
α
2
1−α and using the symmetry of the equilibrium, and
some algebra gives,
Pr (A | a)− α
2
1− α =
1
2
+ 2
1
0
θa
ga(θa)
	
P ∗ (θ)− 1
2


dF (θ) (27)
and because the slope of ga (θa) increases and P ∗ (θ) decreases, we must have that Pr (A | a)
is also decreasing with N .
Once we know that Pr (A | a) decreases with N , we must also have that investment
decreases and therefore, ΔPr (ω, Q) must also be decreasing in N . Since P ∗ (θ) changes
monotonically with ΔPr (ω, Q), it must be the case that P ∗ (θ) changes in the same way
for all types (θq, θa) ∈ [0, 1]2. Using equation (27), the fact that ∂g
a(θa)
∂θa
= 1−P
∗(ga(θa),θa)
P ∗(ga(θa),θa)
we
have that if P ∗ (θ) increases with N , it must be the case that Pr (A | a) also increases. A
contradiction.
Using the investment function the result on ΔPr (ω, Q) follows.
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Proof of Proposition (5). We follow Martinelli (2006) although we must consider a
continuum of types of voters instead of an homogeneously informed voter. First we are
going to construct a random variable that describes the diﬀerence between the probability of
voting for one candidate and the other. Then we are going to apply Berry-Esseen Theorem
(see Bickel and Doksum (2000)).
Let yN = 2
1
0
θa
ga(θa)

P ∗ (θ)− 1
2

dθqdθa on (27). Define the random variableMNi such that
MNi ≡ 12 − yN (1− α) if v = A and MNi ≡ −
1
2
− yN (1− α) if v = Q. It is easy to see that
E

MNi

= 0, E

MNi
2
= 1
4
− (yN (1− α))2 and E
MNi
3

= 2

1
2
4 − (yN (1− α))4

.
Therefore,M
N
i ≡
MNi
2
?
( 14−(yN (1−α))
2)
is a random variable with zero mean, variance equal to
1 andE
	MNi

3


=
2
?
( 12)
2
+(yN (1−α))2
?
2
?
( 14−(yN (1−α))
2)
. DefineMN ≡
2N+1
i=1
M
N
i =
T2N+1(A)− 2N+12 −(2N+1)yN (1−α)
2
?
( 14−(yN (1−α))
2)
and recall that T2N+1 ≡
2N+1
i=1
I (vi = A) is the number of votes for A out of 2N + 1 voters.
We know that A is the winner if T2N+1 > N and Q is the winner if T2N+1 ≤ N ; there-
fore we require that MN = T2N+1(A)−
2N+1
2
−(2N+1)yN (1−α)
2
?
( 14−(yN (1−α))
2)
>
− 1
2
−(2N+1)yN (1−α)
2
?
( 14−(yN (1−α))
2)
for T2N+1 > N .
LetMN ≡ MN
2
√
(2N+1)
and FN be its distribution. The probability of A being the winner is
just the probability thatMN > −
1
2+(2N+1)yN (1−α)
2
?
( 14−(yN (1−α))2)
2
√
(2N+1)
; if we let JN (yN) ≡ −
1
2+(2N+1)yN (1−α)
2
?
( 14−(yN (1−α))2)
2
√
(2N+1)
the
probability of A being the winner is just 1− FN JN (yN)

. Replacing, we get
JN (yN) = −
1
2 2

1
4
− (yN (1− α))2

(2N + 1)
−
2

(2N + 1)yN (1− α)
2

1
4
− (yN (1− α))2
 .
Let Φ be the cdf of a (0, 1) normal random variable, so we can apply the Berry-Esseen
Theorem21 to get that lim
N→∞
FN JN (yN)

→ Φ

JN (yN)

if E
	MNi

3


is finite, which
is the case for some N big enough so yN is close to 0 since ΔPr (ω, Q) approaches 0 and
hence P ∗ (θ)→ 1
2
.22 Now using that Φ is continuous we must have that lim
N→∞
Φ

JN (yN)

→
21Let X1, ....Xn be i.i.d with mean μ = 0 and σ2 = 1. Then, for all n
sup

Pr
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
n
i=1
Xi
2
√
n
≤ t
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠− Φ (t)

≤ 334
E|X1|3
2
√
n
. See Bickel and Doksum (2000).
22Paradoxically, the fact that adding a new voter decreases the average informativeness of each vote is
helpful in order to prove aggregation.
26
Φ
lim
N→∞
JN (yN)

, which implies that lim
N→∞
FN JN (yN)

→ Φ

lim
N→∞
JN (yN)

.
The problem is now the limit of JN (yN) or lim
N→∞
JN (yN) where JN (yN) = −
2
√
(2N+1)yN (1−α)
2
?
( 14−(yN (1−α))
2)
since 1
2 2
?
( 14−(yN (1−α))
2)(2N+1)
→ 0 as N grows. If 2

(2N + 1)yN (1− α)→∞, it follows that
JN (yN) → −∞, and 1 − FN

JN (yN)

→ 1 which makes A the winner almost surely in
state a.
Recall that ΔPr (a,Q) = (2N)!
N !N !

1
4
− (yN (1− α))2
N
therefore
C  (P ∗ (x)) =
x
2
(2N)!
N !N !
	
1
4
− (yN (1− α))2

N
(28)
yN = 2
1
0
⎛
⎜⎝
2θa
θa+ga(θa)
	
P (x)− 1
2


dx
⎞
⎟⎠ dθa
Assume that C 

1
2

= l > 0; since P ∗ (x) is concave we must have P ∗ (x) ≤ P ∗ (0) +
∂P ∗(x)
∂x x=0
x so
zN ≤
(1− α)
l
(2N)!
N !N !
2
√
N
22N

1− (2zN)
2
N
N 1
0
⎛
⎜⎝
2θa
θa+ga(θa)
xdx
⎞
⎟⎠ dθa (29)
where we used that ∂P
∗(x)
∂x =
1
2C(P ∗(x))
(2N)!
N !N !

1
4
− (yN (1− α))2
N
and define zN ≡ yN (1− α) 2
√
N .
Let (2N)!
N !N !
2√N
22N

1− (2zN )
2
N
N
≡ h (zN , N) and note that e−4zN = lim
N→∞

1− (2zN )
2
N
N
and
lim
N→∞
(2N)!
N !N !
2√N
22N
= π−1 so h (zN , N) → e−4zNπ−1. Therefore, since
1
0
2θa
θa+ga(θa)
xdx → 0 we
must have that lim
N→∞
zN = 0. This proves the first part of the proposition.
Now , for the case that C 

1
2

= 0 and C 

1
2

≥ 0 we have that
yN ≥ 2
1
0
⎛
⎜⎝
	
P ∗ (θa + g
a (θa))−
1
2

 2θa
θa+ga(θa)
dx
⎞
⎟⎠ dθa
≥ 2
1
0
	
P ∗ (θa + g
a (θa))−
1
2


(θa − ga (θa)) dθa
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Using concavity of P ∗: P ∗ (θa + ga (θa)) ≥ P ∗ (0) + ∂P
∗(x)
∂x x=θa+ga(θa)
(θa + ga (θa)) it follows
zN ≥ (1− α)h (zN , N)
1
0

(θa)
2 − (ga (θa))2

C  (P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa))
dθa
≥ (1− α)h (zN , N)
1
0
H1 (θa) dθa
where H1 (θa) ≡ ((θa)
2−(ga(θa))2)
C(P ∗(2θa))
and we used C  ≥ 0. Using L’Hopital’s rule we have that
lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H1 (θa) = lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
−2 (ga (θa)) ∂g
a(θa)
∂ΔPr(a,Q)
C  (P ∗ (2θa))
∂P ∗(2θa)
∂ΔPr(a,Q)
Using the system of equations for P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa) and ga (θa)
C (P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa)) =
((θa + ga (θa))P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa)− θa)ΔPr (a,Q)
2
C  (P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa)) =
(θa + ga (θa))ΔPr (a,Q)
2
we have
∂ga (θa)
∂ΔPr (a,Q)
= − H2 (θa)
P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa)ΔPr (a,Q)
(30)
∂P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa)
∂ΔPr (a,Q)
=
θa
2P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa)C  (P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa))
∂P ∗ (2θa)
∂ΔPr (a,Q)
=
θa
C  (P ∗ (2θa))
where we define H2 (θa) = (θa + ga (θa))P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa)− θa. So
lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H1 (θa) = lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
2 (ga (θa))
H2(θa)
P ∗(ga(θa)+θa)ΔPr(a,Q)
C  (P ∗ (2θa))
θa
C(P ∗(2θa))
= lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
2
P ∗(ga(θa)+θa)
(ga(θa))
θa
H2(θa)
ΔPr(a,Q)
C(P ∗(2θa))
C(P ∗(2θa))
= 4 lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H2 (θa)C  (P ∗ (2θa))
C  (P ∗ (2θa))ΔPr (a,Q)
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L’Hopital again gives that lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H2(θa)C(P ∗(2θa))
ΔPr(a,Q) is equal to
lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
	
H2 (θa)C  (P ∗ (2θa)) ∂P
∗ (2θa)
∂ΔPr (a,Q)
+
∂H2 (θa)
∂ΔPr (a,Q)
C  (P ∗ (2θa))


Using the expressions for ∂P
∗(ga(θa)+θa)
∂ΔPr(a,Q) and
∂ga(θa)
∂ΔPr(a,Q) to get
∂H2(θa)
∂ΔPr(a,Q) in (30) we have that
lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H2(θa)C(P ∗(2θa))
ΔPr(a,Q) is equal to
lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
θa (ga (θa) + θa)C  (P ∗ (2θa))
2P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa)C  (P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa))
(31)
+ lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
	H2 (θa)C  (P ∗ (2θa)) θa
C  (P ∗ (2θa))
− H2 (θa)C
 (P ∗ (2θa))
ΔPr (a,Q)


and some algebra gives that 2 lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H2(θa)C(P ∗(2θa))
ΔPr(a,Q) is equal to
lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H2 (θa) θaC
 (P ∗ (2θa))
C  (P ∗ (2θa))
+ lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
θa (ga (θa) + θa)C  (P ∗ (2θa))
2P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa)C  (P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa))
Since H2 (θa) ≥ 0 (see (16)) and lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
θa(ga(θa)+θa)
2P ∗(ga(θa)+θa)
= 2 (θa)
2
2 lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H2 (θa)C  (P ∗ (2θa))
ΔPr (a,Q)
≥ 2 (θa)2 lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
C  (P ∗ (2θa))
C  (P ∗ (ga (θa) + θa))
using that C  ≥ 0 and ga (θa) < θa, it follows that
lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H2 (θa)C  (P ∗ (θa + ga (θa)))
ΔPr (a,Q)
≥ (θa)2
so using that C  (P ∗ (2θa)) ≥ C  (P ∗ (θa + ga (θa))) we have
lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H1 (θa) ≥ 4 lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
(θa)
2
C  (P ∗ (θa + ga (θa)))
and therefore if lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
C  (P ∗ (θa + ga (θa))) → 0 (as it is for C 

1
2

= 0) we have
lim
ΔPr(a,Q)→0
H1 (θa) → ∞, which proves that zN → ∞. If C 

1
2

= l > C 

1
2

= 0, a lower
bound for zN is obtained.
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